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I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1994, a group of school districts in North Carolina
asked me and my colleagues to investigate the possibility of a lawsuit
challenging the State's school finance system. In fall 2002, we re-
ceived a favorable decision from the state supreme court regarding the
right to a sound basic education, which was followed by a lengthy trial
and a largely favorable decision from the trial court.
1 The State ap-
pealed, and the appeal process lasted several months. I will describe
here the background and high points of the litigation and the recent
July 30, 2004 ruling in the case.
2
II LITIGATING LEANDRO
Our prospective clients were a small group of largely rural and
poor school districts in the eastern part of North Carolina. The school
superintendents in these districts felt strongly that the existing fi-
nance system was inherently unfair to the extent that it relied on local
property taxes to fund education. Because of the limited tax bases in
these districts, the money available for education was substantially
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Partner, Helms, Mulliss and Wicker, P.L.L.C., Raleigh, North Carolina. During
the litigation described in this Article, Robert Tiller was a partner at Parker, Poe,
Adams and Bernstein L.L.P. in Raleigh.
1. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 255 (N.C. 1997).
2. See infra Part III.
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less than in wealthier districts, and the educational quality suffered
accordingly.
Because of my constitutional law experience, I was asked to do the
initial legal research for this possible claim. I quickly determined that
an earlier decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals presented a
serious roadblock.3 The case had rejected a state equal protection
claim based on unequal funding for a poor school district. An equal
protection challenge to the existing system looked unpromising.
For this reason, I reviewed the possibility of a claim challenging
the existing school finance system based on educational adequacy.
The education section of the North Carolina Constitution provided a
good starting point. "The people have a right to the privilege of educa-
tion, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right."4
"The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a
general and uniform system of free public schools . . .wherein equal
opportunities shall be provided for all students."5 There were few
cases interpreting this language. Part of the wording dated from the
reconstruction era, while part of it was drafted in the 1970s. The his-
torical evidence pertaining to the language was limited, but the lan-
guage itself was strong support for a crucial proposition-that the
North Carolina Constitution provided a substantive right to an ade-
quate education. Caselaw from several other states, including Ken-
tucky and West Virginia, also supported this approach.6
The next question was whether our clients could credibly argue
that the State had denied them a right to an adequate education. To
answer this question, we collected extensive data regarding our five
client districts. The State had rated these districts as low-performing
based on test scores and other data. Some of the specialists in the
State's Department of Public Instruction were sympathetic to the
plight of these poor school districts, and provided reports regarding
these schools and others. Using data generated by the State and by
our school districts, we compared our districts both to state averages
and to wealthier districts.
We found that our poor school districts were at a disadvantage in
several respects compared to the wealthier districts in the state. Even
though the State provided a substantial portion 7 of funding for local
districts, individual districts varied considerably in their ability to
raise additional funds from property taxes. These funding differences
3. Britt v. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), review denied
and appeal dismissed, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987).
4. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
5. Id. art. IX, § 2.
6. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Pauley v. Bailey, 324
S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984).
7. The State provided about two-thirds on average.
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translated into gaps of hundreds of dollars per classroom each year.
These funding differences affected teacher pay and recruitment, avail-
ability of books and other materials, the variety of program and course
offerings, the quality of technology and equipment, and the mainte-
nance of facilities. We also observed large differences in various per-
formance indicators, including reading and math test scores, SAT and
other standardized test scores, and reports of performance of high
school graduates in the University of North Carolina system.
In investigating the school-funding structure, we spoke with local
school administrators and parents. Several parents and their stu-
dents from each school district volunteered as plaintiffs based on their
dissatisfaction with the quality of the educational opportunities pro-
vided by the State. We anticipated (correctly, it turned out) that the
State would attempt to challenge the standing of the school districts,
and expected that the inclusion of concerned parents and students
would help address this point.
One of the students I spoke with was Rob Leandro (pronounced
Lee-ANN-dro) of Hoke County. Rob was then in high school and was
particularly articulate about the weaknesses of the educational oppor-
tunities available to him. Based in part on his strong interest, and in
part on the interesting sound of his name, he became our lead plain-
tiff. It later became clear that Rob was an exceptionally gifted individ-
ual, and he eventually received numerous scholarship offers to top
universities. The State eventually focused on Rob's successes in an
attempt to prove that the educational offerings available to him were
more than adequate. Although this argument seemed superficial, we
were forced to carefully explain that his successes were highly un-
usual and were explained in large part by his supportive home
environment.
Based on extensive research, we filed our initial complaint in May
1994. Our complaint contended that the existing school finance sys-
tem was unconstitutional based on alternative grounds of equity (that
is, equal protection) and adequacy (that is, lack of the substantive ele-
ments required for an education under the state constitution). We in-
tended to distinguish the Britt8 case, but if our equity argument
failed, we would proceed on the grounds of adequacy.
Soon after filing the complaint, six wealthy districts intervened in
the case as plaintiffs. Using phrasing drawn from our complaint, the
complaint of these districts also presented claims of equity and ade-
quacy. The wealthy districts focused on the special needs of their poor
and minority children and the weighty burdens of their municipal
budgets.
8. Britt v. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. 1987).
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Our chosen venue was Hoke County, the smallest and poorest of
our client districts. 9 The State obtained a change of venue to Wake
County, one of the wealthy intervenor districts, where our state capi-
tal of Raleigh is located. The State moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. This motion was denied, and the State appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed based on Britt.lo We sought discre-
tionary review from the state supreme court, which took the case. The
supreme court, with one justice dissenting, rejected our equal protec-
tion argument, but unanimously accepted our contention that the
state constitution provided a fundamental right to an education of
good quality. 1 The North Carolina Supreme Court set forth in sev-
eral paragraphs the elements of the constitutional right, which it de-
fined as "a sound basic education."12
These elements included substantive knowledge to be taught in ar-
eas such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, geography, and
history, and also a general requirement of "sufficient academic and
vocational skills to enable the student to compete on an equal basis
with others in further formal education or gainful employment in con-
temporary society."13 The court wrote: "An education that does not
serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in
the society in which they live and work is devoid of substance and is
constitutionally inadequate."14
The supreme court also described the factors to be considered in
determining if the constitutional standard of a sound basic education
had been violated by the State. These included both output or out-
come measures, such as student performance on standardized tests,
and input measures, such as the level of per-pupil expenditures. 15
Following remand, the case was assigned to Judge Howard E.
Manning, Jr. Judge Manning established a procedure of periodic in-
chambers meetings of the court and counsel to address informally is-
sues of discovery and procedure. The judge also made himself availa-
ble as needed to assist the parties as disputes arose. At the direction
of Judge Manning, the parties considered the feasibility of focusing
the initial phase of the proceedings on a single school district. Hoke
County was ultimately chosen as the model district.
We were content with the choice of Hoke, because in several re-
spects it epitomized the problems of poor, rural school districts. Its
9. The others were Cumberland, Halifax, Robeson, and Vance counties.
10. Leandro v. State, 468 S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C.
1997).
11. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); see N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
12. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 255.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 254.
15. Id.
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population is about 28,000, and its county seat, Raeford, has about
4,000 residents. Farming is a major economic activity, and the lead-
ing industries are poultry processing and light manufacturing. Hoke
County has no universities, no museums, and no major shopping cen-
ters. There is no hospital. The primary entertainment on Friday
nights in the fall is the high school's football games. The main civic
event of the year is the North Carolina Turkey Festival.
The Hoke school system at that time included six elementary
schools, two middle schools, and one high school, together serving
about 6,000 students. About half of those students were African-
American, about fourteen percent Native American, about three per-
cent Hispanic and other minorities, and the remaining third were
white. Approximately three-quarters of the students were officially
designated as eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.
In the course of preparing for trial, I came to know the Hoke
County schools well. In some schools, I observed worn-out buildings
with no soap or paper towels in the bathrooms. I saw science class-
rooms that lacked basic science equipment, and social studies class-
rooms with out-of-date maps and globes. There were also three
relatively new and attractive schools, although these schools had
problems of overcrowding and lack of maintenance. I became well-ac-
quainted with the best motel in Hoke 16 and the best lunch spots.
To find witnesses, I interviewed many teachers and administra-
tors. Not surprisingly, I found that many of the educators did not
have much experience outside Hoke County and did not fully appreci-
ate the shortcomings of their system. At the same time, I met some
accomplished professionals who were dedicated to their students and
had considerable understanding of their situation. The unofficial
motto, which I heard from a number of these educators, was, "We do
the best we can with what we've got."
One of the projects I organized to educate my potential witnesses
was a field trip to another school district with considerably more re-
sources. One Friday, a large van of teachers, students, and parents
traveled to Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and visited a group of schools
there. As we viewed the well-designed and well-equipped facilities,
the Hoke group reacted first with surprise and then with a degree of
anger as they realized their relative disadvantage.
The State demanded extensive discovery, including production of
records from every school and depositions of every principal and top
administrator. Deposition preparation took many hours, to ensure
that the school witnesses would not inadvertently hurt our case. The
deposition process, while arduous, was useful in revealing that some
16. The Days Inn.
2005] 897
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administrators and others had the necessary gumption to serve as ef-
fective witnesses.
For our part, we obtained some of our most useful discovery
through Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. 1 7 The State produced, as its official
representatives, several top assistant superintendents to address spe-
cific areas. These depositions, along with depositions of the state su-
perintendent and the chairman of the state board of education, yielded
significant concessions regarding the difficulties faced by Hoke and
other similar districts, and the importance of additional resources to
address student needs.
After extensive discovery, we finally began our trial in September
1999. Our lead witness was Jeff Moss, then assistant superintendent
for the Hoke schools. Under my questioning, Mr. Moss testified for a
day-and-a-half regarding numerous challenges faced by the school
system. His testimony touched on all the themes we would eventually
develop, including the poverty of much of the student population and
their special needs, the lack of supplemental programs and materials,
difficulties in recruiting and retaining quality teachers, deficiencies in
materials and equipment, including technology, and problems with
school facilities. Mr. Moss also testified about the poor performance of
Hoke students on the state's standardized tests and other tests. He
withstood with dignity a highly unpleasant cross examination from
the State that touched on such personal matters as his prior marriage
and the performance of his children.
The trial was quickly interrupted by Hurricane Floyd, which
caused extensive flooding in eastern North Carolina, and was ex-
tended by other problems, including a shortage of courtroom space.
Ultimately the trial lasted twenty-three days. There were twenty-six
witnesses and 670 exhibits. Experts testified for both sides regarding
school resources, and student achievement.
The State's central theme was that it was satisfying constitutional
standards simply by virtue of providing schools that were operating.
The State emphasized that it had, among other things, a system for
licensing teachers, a system for distributing funding, and a system for
evaluating student performance. It also argued that any problems in
Hoke were Hoke's own fault and not the State's.
Judge Manning issued his decision in four lengthy installments,
the first of which was filed in October 2000.18 In addressing the cen-
tral issues, Judge Manning focused particularly on the failure of ap-
proximately a third of Hoke students to satisfy the State's own
standard for grade level performance. Judge Manning placed particu-
17. N.C. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
18. Hoke County Bd. ofEduc. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *1-45
(N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000).
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lar emphasis on the needs of at-risk children and found that these
students needed special help to meet educational standards. He also
placed particular emphasis on early education and directed that a pre-
kindergarten program be offered to all at-risk students in the state.
In a supplemental decision, Judge Manning unequivocally rejected the
State's efforts to blame Hoke for its problems and made clear that the
ultimate responsibility for providing a sound basic education lies with
the State. The judge directed the State to begin working with Hoke to
address the constitutional deficiencies in the schools.
Although the State appealed this decision, it did not seek a stay. A
team from the state Department of Public Instruction visited Hoke
and began evaluating its programs. We pressed for concrete assis-
tance, which was not forthcoming. In the meantime, the appeal pro-
ceeded for almost another two years.
During the course of proceedings from 1994 to late 2002, the State
increased its program of supplemental funding for low-wealth schools.
This program received approximately $18.2 million in 1994. In 2001,
the program received $85 million. The low-wealth money in Hoke
County has paid for teachers, books and equipment that were badly
needed, although it has not come close to meeting all the important
needs. It is widely thought that the increases in state funding for this
program were in large part the result of the Leandro case.
III CONCLUSION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On July 30, 2004, the plaintiffs achieved a significant victory. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina issued a unanimous opinion af-
firming in large part the decision of Judge Manning. 19 The court re-
jected the State's contention that the trial court applied the wrong
standards for determining that students had been deprived of their
constitutional right to a sound basic education, and held that the
plaintiffs had made a clear showing of a constitutional violation. The
following points from the lengthy opinion are particularly significant
for counsel addressing school finance issues.
The court approved the basic structure of the lawsuit as a declara-
tory judgment action. It found that the trial court was correct in con-
sidering evidence regarding all Hoke County students, rather than
limiting evidence to the named plaintiffs. The court found that in de-
claratory judgment actions involving a significant public interest, the
issue was whether there was a clear showing of a constitutional viola-
tion with respect to students within the zone of interest protected by
the constitutional right at issue.2o
19. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004).
20. Id. at 376-77.
2005]
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The court upheld the trial court's determination that there was
such a clear showing with respect to the students in Hoke County.
The court discussed both test scores and other evidence of outputs,
including graduation rates, dropout rates, postsecondary performance
in community colleges and public universities, and evidence from em-
ployers of inability to compete in the job market. It found that an in-
ordinate number of Hoke students had consistently performed below
the state average in all available output measures. 21
In addition, the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the
State was required to provide a resource allocation system that pro-
vided competent teachers in every classroom, competent principals in
every school, and resources necessary to support effective instruction.
The court noted that Judge Manning focused particularly on the needs
of at-risk students in Hoke County, but it made clear that the right to
a sound basic education applied to non-at-risk students as well.22
The only significant point on which the supreme court declined to
affirm Judge Manning concerned pre-kindergarten. The court found
that the trial court's order of pre-kindergarten for all at-risk students
was premature at this juncture.2 3
With respect to the remedy, the court found that Judge Manning
acted reasonably in declining to dictate a solution and instead al-
lowing the State an initial opportunity to assess resource allocations
and correct constitutional deficiencies. It noted that the legislative
and executive branches share responsibility for educating students.
At the same time, the court made clear that it remains the ultimate
arbiter of the Constitution. The court remanded the case for further
proceedings as necessary with respect to other counties.
24
21. Id. at 381-86.
22. Id. at 388.
23. Id. at 395.
24. Id. at 397.
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